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Swanberg: Conflict of Laws Governing Annulment of Marriage
MONTANA LAW REVIEW
faced with the problem of letting a judgment go by default or
traveling some distance to litigate a groundless claim."
Burke McNamer.

CONFLICT OF LAWS GOVERNING ANNULMENT
OF MARRIAGE
H and W, domiciled in Montana, are married in Idaho and
return at once to Montana. By the law of one State or the other, the marriage is invalid.1 Two questions arise: (1) The Courts
of which State should take jurisdiction to annul this marriage?
(2) What law should those Courts apply to determine whether
an annulment should be granted?
The cases are by no means in agreement as to the answer to
the first of these questions. This uncertainty is amply illustrated by reference to the decisions of one jurisdiction, New Jersey.
In Blumenthal v. Tannenholz,2 the Court refused to take jurisdiction to annul a marriage contracted within the State; in
Avakian v. Aviakian,' the Court granted an annulment although
neither party was domiciled within the State and the marriage
did not take place there; and in Capasso v. Colonna,' the Court
refused to annul a marriage contracted in New York when the
parties were domiciled in New Jersey at all times.
Some Courts, distinguishing between void and voidable
marriages, have held that, whereas a void marriage may be annulled in either the State of domicil at time of suit or the State
where it was celebrated, a marriage which is voidable merely
can be annulled only in the State where it was celebrated'. The
majority of Courts today, however, in the interest of certainty
and uniformity, are inclined to give exclusive jurisdiction to
the Courts of the State wherein the parties are domiciled at the
"While the Montana statute, drafted carefully in the Ught of earlier
test cases, answers most questions, some are left unanswered. E. g.,
may a non-resident plaintiff take advantage of the act? That he may,
see Beach v. Perdue Co., 35 Del. 285, 163 Atl. 265 (1932). It was held
in State ex re. Ledin v. Davidson, 216 Wis. 216, 256 N. W. 718 (1934),
that plaintiff may not sue the executor or administrator of the deceased non-resident.
, 99 P. (2d) (1940), involved similar
Mont.'Cross v. Cross, facts. It was decided, however, after this note was written.
'31 N. J. Eq. 194 (1879).
'69 N. J. Eq. 89, 60 AtL. 521 (1905).
495 N. J. Eq. 35, 122 Atl. 378 (1923) aff'd., 96 N. J. Eq. 385, 124 AtM
760 (1924).
*Levy v. Downing, 213 Mass. 334, 100 N. E. 638 (1913); Sutton v.
Warren, 10 Met. 451 (Mass., 1845) ; Hiram v. Pierce, 45 Me. 367, 71
Am. Dec. 555 (1858) ; Cunningham v. Cunningham, 206 N. Y. 341, 99
, TRATISE
N. E. 845, 43 L. R. A. (N. S.) 355 (1912) ; JOSEPH H. Bir
ON THE CONFU T OF LAws (1935), Sec. 115.1.
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time the annulment is sought.' Thus, in Antoine v. Antoine,'
a suit to annul a Mississippi marriage, the Supreme Court of
Mississippi said, "Both of these parties being domiciled in Alabama, that Court, and not this one, has jurisdiction in this
cause." This trend is likewise shown by the fact that Dean
Goodrich, in the 1927 edition of his text on the Conflict of Laws,
favored the taking of jurisdiction by the State wherein the marriage took place, but in the 1938 edition he said, "Jurisdiction
to annul a marriage by declaring it ineffective from the beginning is vested only in the courts of the domicil of the parties'"'.
But it may be doubted whether the jurisdiction of either State
should be exclusive. Even though Montana is allowed jurisdiction to annul a marriage celebrated in Idaho, it would not
seem to follow that Idaho, the State by whose law the validity
of the marriage is generally determined, should be denied jurisdiction.
In the case where the parties have separated and so have
given rise to the possibility of different domiciles, the rules
governing jurisdiction to annul the marriage are, in general,
the same as those governing jurisdiction to grant a divorce'.
Turning now to the second question, it is apparent that,
although the Montana Court may properly take jurisdiction to
annul the marriage, its own annulment statutes setting forth
the grounds of annulment would not necessarily apply. There
remains the independent problem of choice of the law governing
the right to an annulment. A solution to this problem requires
that a further question be asked, viz., what law determines the
validity of the marriage1'? Whose law will determine, for instance, whether the parties were old enough to enter into an
unimpeachable marriage contract without the consent of their
parents, or whether they were of too close kinship to enter into
an unimpeachable marriage contract? It is a generally accepted maxim that a marriage valid where celebrated is valid
'McCormack v. McCormack, 175 Cal. 292, 165 Pac. 930 (1917) ; Montague v. Montague, 25 S. D. 471, 127 N. W. 639, 30 L. R. A. (N. S.)
745, Ann. Cas. 1912C 591 (1910); Turner v. Turner, 85 N. H. 249,
157 AtI. 532 (1931) ; Gwin v. Gwin, 219 Ala. 552, 122 So. 648 (1929).
'132 Miss. 442, 96 So. 305 (1923).
HERBERT F. GOODRICH, HANDBOOK ON THE CONFICTS OF LAWS, 1st Edition (1927), page 301; 2d Edition (1938), page 354.
RESTATEMENT, CONFLICTS OF LAWS, See. 115; BEAL,

TBEATrsE ON THE

CONFLICTS OF LAWS, Sec. 113.11.

"In a divorce proceeding, the original validity of the marriage contract itself is not in question, because a divorce Is based on causes
arising after the marriage took place; accordingly, the Courts to which
the parties have appealed for their divorce look to their own law to
determine whether a divorce should be granted. Since an annulment
is given for causes antedating the marriage (which causes, to be
grounds for an annulment, must be shown in some measure to affect
the validity of the marriage contract itself), it is a fundamentally
different proceeding.
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everywhere'1 . This maxim is misleading because it intimates
that the State wherein the marriage took place is the sole determiner of the validity of the marriage, but as will be shown
presently, the State of the domicil of the parties at the time of
the marriage has an equally important interest". Consequently,
distinctions must be drawn, based on public policy, between the
types of grounds of annulment. Thus, in the case originally
put, if the laws of Idaho as to the age of H and W were not
satisfied, then Montana clearly could annul the marriage, relying
however, on Idaho law. If, on the other hand, the marriage
were valid according to Idaho law, then a Montana Court could
not annul it; since it is valid in Idaho, this marriage, even
though it would have been invalid if celebrated in Montana, is
valid in Montana". The prevalent policy of upholding marriages outweighs the advisability of granting an annulment
unless the marriage runs counter to the morals of the domicil".
But the role played by public policy readily appears if it be
assumed that H in the illustration were a negro and W a white
woman. A Montana Court should have no hesitancy in declaring the marriage void even though it was valid under Idaho
law, because R.C.M., Secs. 5700" and 5703", taken together, de1'5 R. C. L. 993;

RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS, Sec. 121; and see
note 13.
"According to BEALE, TREATISE ON THE CONFLICTS OF LAWS, Secs. 136.1

and 132.6, the law of the domicil is the final determiner of the validity
of the marriage; the law of the place of celebration applies only as
a result of the former's choice of law rule.

'3R. C. M., 1935, Sec. 5707. "All marriages contracted without the
State, which would be valid in by the laws of the country in which
the same were contracted, are valid in this State."

"McDonald v. McDonald, 6 Cal. (2d) 457, 58 P. (2d) 163, 104 A. L. R.
1290 (1936); Sturgis v. Sturgis, 51 Ore. 10, 93 Pac. 696, 15 L. R. A.
(N. S.) 1034, 131 Am. St. Rep. 724 (1908) ; Lyannes v. Lyannes, 171
W-is. 381, 177 N. W. 683 (1920) ; but see Ross v. Bryant, 90 Okla.
300, 217 Pac. 364 (1923).
15R. C. M., 1935, Sec. 5700. "Every marriage hereafter contracted or
solemnised between a white person and a negro, or a person of negro
blood or in part negro, shall be utterly null and void."

-R. C. M., 1935, Sec. 5703. "Every such marriage mentioned in either of
th foregoing sections (5700-5702) which may be hereafter contracted or
solemnised without the State of Montana by any person who has,
prior to the time of contracting or solemnising said marriage, been a
resident of the State of Montana, shall be null and void within the
State of Montana". This statute, while the language is broad, probably does not mean that such a marriage Is void if the parties were

at any time prior thereto domiciled In Montana. Acquisition of a new
domicil between the time of their marriage in another State, and the
time when they were formerly domiciled in Montana should Insulate
their marriage from a suit for nullity in Montana. State v. Ross,

76 N. C. 242 (1877) ; Pierce v. Pierce, 58 Wash. 622, 109 Pac. 45
(1910) ; State v. Fenn, 47 Wash. 561, 92 Pac. 417, 17 L. R. A. (N. S.)
800, 1907). Instead of 4nnulling the marriage in this situation, It
would be better to adopt the view suggested by the RESTATEMENT,
CONFLICTS OF LAW (Sec. 134), and refuse to allow these persons cer-
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clare the policy of this State that the marriage of a white person and a negro who were, prior to their marriage in another
State, domiciled in Montana, is void" in Montana. These sections thus clearly amend the general rule of Sec. 5707 that a
marriage valid by the laws of the State wherein it was celebrated is valid in Montana. The marriage might possibly be
declared void' on grounds of policy not expressly stated in Sec.
5703.
That the law of both the State of marriage and the domicil
at the time of marriage determines the validity of the marriage
is more forcefully brought out when three States are involved.
Suppose H and W are domiciled in Washington at the time
of their marriage in Idaho and move at once to Montana. The
cases" indicate that while Montana should take jurisdiction, it
should look to the laws of both Washington and Idaho to determine the validity of the marriage, and that if Washington
would have annulled, Montana should do so".
Beale asserts' that, if the parties are domiciled in different
States at the time of the marriage, it takes both States to avoid
it, i.e., unless invalid by the laws of both States it will be held
tain marital privileges while within the State. But it may be doubted whether this is an example of annulment at all or rather involves
R. C. M., 1935, Sec. 5728 (see footnote 18), providing for an entirely
independent procedure for declaring void this marriage.
1
7R C. M., 1935, Sec. 5699, provides that the marriage of first cousins,
uncle and neice, brother and sister, etc., is incestuous and void from
the beginning. It does not follow that this statute is as broad in
scope as Sec. 5703. It may be held to apply to the marriages of all
Montana domiciliaries wherever the marriage was entered into, to
marriages entered into in Montana, or both. In Johnson v. Johnson,
57 Wash. 89, 106 Pac. 500, 26 L. R. A. (N. S.) 179 (1910), H and W
were domiciled in Washington at the time of their marriage in British Columbia. Washington annulled the marriage because it was
in violation of their statute forbidding first cousins from marrying.
The law of British Columbia did not appear. But in Leefeld v. Leefeld, 85 Ore. 287, 166 Pac. 953 (1917), H and W were domiciled in Oregon at the time of their marriage in Washington. Oregon refused to
annul the marriage, saying that their statute prohibiting first cousins
from marrying was penal in nature and had no extra-territorial effect. It Is hard to see why an annulment could not have been granted, using the Washington statute as a basis, unless that statute had
been construed to apply to Washington domiciliaries only.
"R. C. M., 1935, Sec. 5728. "Either party to an incestuous or void marriage may proceed, by action in the District Court, to have the same
so declared." Instead of declaring the general purpose of the chapter
on annulment, there are good grounds for believing that this statute
provides for an entirely different procedure.
"Hall v. Industrial Accident Commission, 165 Wis. 364, 162 N. W. 312,
L. R. A. 1917D 829 (1917) ; Huard v. MeTeigh, 113 Ore. 279, 232 Pac.
658, 39 A. L. R. 528 (1925) ; Meisenhelder v. Chicago & N. W. R. R.
Co., 170 Minn. 317, 213 N. W. 32, 51 A. L. R. 1408 (1927) ; In re Ommang's Estate, 183 Minn. 92, 235 N. W. 529 (1931).
1JosEsH H. BrAzz, TRsATISE ON THE CONrLICT or LAwS, See. 132.5.
"Owen v. Owen, 178 Wis. 609, 190 N. W. 363, 32 A. L. R. 1100 (1922);
People ex rel. Schutt v. Siems, 198 Ill. App. 342 (1916).
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good. Of course, the State by whose law the marriage is invalid can refuse to allow these parties certain privileges of the
marital relationship while the parties are within that State.*
William Swanberg.

VALIDITY OF NON-VOTING PROVISIONS IN
CORPORATE STOCK
According to the records of the Secretary of State, the device
of non-voting stock is used occasionally in Montana. This practice apparently is authorized by Section 5905, R.C.M., 1935,
which requires that the articles of incorporation set forth "the
amount of its capital stock, and the number of shares into
which it is divided, and if there is to be more than one (1)
class of stock created by the articles of incorporation, a designation of each class and the number of shares into which it
is divided, and a designation of the voting powers or rights,
if any, of any or all classes
of stock, with any limitations or
•
restrictions thereof, *0 .I
However, this Section must be read in the light of the State
constitution, Article XV, See. 4, which reads: "The legislative
assembly shall provide by law that in all elections for directors
or trustees of incorporated companies, every shareholder shall
have the right to vote in person or by proxy the number of
shares of stock owned by him for as many persons as there
are directors or trustees to be elected, or to cumulate said
shares, and give one candidate as many votes as the number of
directors multiplied by the number of his shares of stock shall
equal, or to distribute them, on the same principle, among as
many candidates as he shall think fit, and such directors or
trustees shall not be elected in any other manner."'
Article XV, Sec. 4, appears to have more than one purpose.
First, it establishes the share of stock as the unit of voting
"Cross v. Cross, decided by the Montana Supreme Court March 15, 1940,
agrees in substance with the conclusions of this note, quoting from 38
C. J. 1349 to the effect that "Jurisdiction of the marriage re8 depends
upon the residence or the domicile of the plaintiff, and It Is immaterial where the marriage was solemnized." However, it having been
recognized earlier that annulment declares the marriage void ab initio,
this statement, although correctly stating jurisdiction for divorce, begs
the question as to annulment because the very question at issue is
whether a marriage res ever existed. But the statement is consistent
with the modern view that the domicil ultimately controls the validity
of the original marriage. Moreover, it is entirely possible that R. C.
M., 1935, Sec. 5729, which sets forth the causes for annulling marriages
operates to dissolve the marriage from the time of the decree only,
and not from the time of marriage. If this is the case, then the law
governing annulment is much the same as the law governing divorce.
'See also Art. XV, Sec. 10, which might affect Sec. 5905.
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